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Abstract 
We investigate the impact of a firm’s compensation consultant choice on executive 
compensation by examining shifts in consultant choice following a 2009 US Securities 
Exchange Commission requirement that firms disclose fees paid to compensation consultants 
for both consulting and other services. We show that the disclosure rule change acted as a 
separating device distinguishing firms likely to have used compensation consultants to extract 
rents from shareholders from firms that were likely to have used consultants to optimally set 
pay. We conclude that not all multiservice consultants are conflicted while not all specialist 
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 ‘The upshot is that a mediocre-or-worse CEO - aided by his handpicked VP of human 
relations and a consultant from the ever-accommodating firm of Ratchet, Ratchet, and 
Bingo - all too often receives gobs of money from an ill-designed compensation 
arrangement.’ 
- Warren E. Buffett, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2005 annual report, (2006, p. 
161) 
 
1. Introduction 
How is Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay set? Economic theory argues that CEO pay is 
efficiently set to attract good candidates and provide the optimal level of incentives to motivate 
the candidates to increase shareholder value (the optimal contracting hypothesis). A large body 
of literature (see Prendergast, 1999 or Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999) has identified 
economic determinants of optimal executive compensation. However, an alternative body of 
literature (see for example, Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, 2004) has argued that CEOs have a great 
deal of power over the pay-setting decision and use their power to extract rents from the board 
in the form of excessive pay (the rent extraction hypothesis). As evidence, this literature points 
to the rapid growth of CEO pay in both absolute and relative terms. The popular press notes 
for example, that in 2013 CEOs of firms in the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 index were 
paid, on average, over 200 times the average worker’s salary in their firms2.  Business leaders 
and politicians, among others, argue that compensation consultants, employed by firms to 
advise on executive pay, are at least partly to blame for these apparently excessive pay 
arrangements (see for example, the quote above, Crystal, 1991, or Waxman, 2007). 
However, despite extensive research, the extant literature on compensation consultants 
has found little evidence that hiring consultants leads to higher pay, let alone whether they help 
set optimal incentives or help managers extract rents. Prior studies have typically classified 
                                                          
1 Retrieved from: http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2005ar/2005ar.pdf 
2 See for example, Smith, Elliot Blair and Phil Kuntz, 2013, ‘CEO pay 1,795-to-1 multiple of wages skirts U.S. 
law’, Bloomberg, April 29, 2013. Retrieved from: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-04-30/ceo-
pay-1-795-to-1-multiple-of-workers-skirts-law-as-sec-delays 
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consultants on the ex ante likelihood that they will face conflicts of interest in providing advice 
on executive compensation. For example, consultants who provide multiple services to the firm 
along with those that are hired by the management are typically hypothesized to be ex ante 
more conflicted than other consultants. However, whether the consultant is actually conflicted 
depends on who made the choice to hire the consultant. If the CEO has relative power over the 
board, it is plausible that the multiservice consultant could be influenced to favor managers 
(perhaps by offering them other compensated services). If the board has relative power in the 
choice, it is plausible that the multiservice consultant provides the best advice at the best price 
for the additional services rendered, irrespective of the advice provided on executive 
compensation. Since the underlying decision making process to hire a compensation consultant 
was unknown, it has been almost impossible for a researcher using standard proxies for 
corporate governance and CEO power to distinguish the two. Furthermore, even in firms where 
the consultant is hired by the board consultants may be sensitive to CEO influence. As 
Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002) note: “even if the CEO is not normally involved in the 
selection of the compensation consultant, the threat of his involvement the next time-should 
the consultant suggest a package not to his liking-is likely to keep the consultant in line” (page 
790). Hence, ex ante classification schemes have proved unable to separate consultants who 
have likely been hired to provide optimal compensation schemes from those who have been 
hired to facilitate rent extraction. 
In our paper, we use a comprehensive longitudinal dataset of over 1,000 unique publicly 
listed firms in the United States (US) that hired compensation consultants over the 2006 to 
2012 period. This period is characterized by a change in disclosure rule requirements in 2009 
that strikingly increased the turnover of compensation consultants at firms. The disclosure rule 
change allowed us to separate consultants who were hired for optimal contracting from those 
who were likely hired to facilitate rent extraction. Specifically, in July 2009, the Securities 
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Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed (and subsequently enacted in December 2009) 
additional disclosure rules requiring firms that purchase other services from their compensation 
consultants to disclose fees paid for both compensation consulting and other services. If the 
consultants were retained to solely provide advice on pay, fees did not have to be disclosed. 
This rule change expanded an existing requirement to disclose use of a compensation 
consultant, enacted in 2006, and was targeted specifically at clients of multiservice firms, as 
the significant fees associated with additional services provided by the same firm were 
suspected of biasing the consultant to favor executives.  To illustrate the relative economic 
significance of these other fees, client firms in our sample reported a median of $600,435 of 
other fees (i.e., 4.4 times the median compensation consulting fee of $135,380) after the 
disclosure rule came into effect.  
We distinguish between three types of client firms after 2009. Some clients who had 
previously used multiservice consultants switched to newly spun-off specialist consultants 
(related switchers), while others switched to unrelated specialists (unrelated switchers). 
Finally, some stayed with the same multiservice consultants (stayers). Each of these choices 
had costs and benefits for both the CEO and the board (see Table 1). The relative magnitude 
of these costs and benefits allow us to distinguish firms where the board is likely to have had 
power over the choice of consultant from firms where the executive is likely to have had the 
power. Specifically, we hypothesize that client firms that switched to the newly spun-off related 
specialist consultants are the ones where the CEO has power over the choice of consultant. In 
contrast, firms that stayed with their existing multiservice consultants (and explicitly disclosed 
the amount of consultant compensation) for both executive compensation and other consulting 
services, or firms that switched to unrelated specialists, are likely to be firms where the board 
had power over the choice of consultant.  
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Consistent with the rent extraction hypothesis, we find that client firms where the board 
is more likely to be under the influence of the CEO are more likely to switch from a 
multiservice compensation consultant to a related, spun-off specialist. Comparing CEO pay 
levels at the stayers against the switchers, client firms that remained with multiservice 
consultants paid their CEOs 18.32% (median values) less than a matched sample of firms that 
switched to the newly spun-off specialist consultants after 2009. In addition, the stayers also 
paid their CEOs 13.68% (median values) less in the pre-2009 period. Decomposing total 
compensation shows that the pay difference is statistically and economically significant for all 
components of non-incentive and incentive pay in both the pre-2009 and the post-switch 
periods. This suggests that prior to the rule change, some firms employing multi-service 
consultants were already paying their executives significantly smaller salaries but these firms 
could not be distinguished from firms that overpaid their executives. As a robustness check, 
we also compare CEO pay at stayers against unrelated switchers. Consistent with our 
expectations, we do not find a significant difference in pay levels in this setting either before 
or after the 2009 disclosure rule change. We conclude that the behaviour of client firms in 
response to the 2009 SEC rule change indeed acted as a separating device.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature. Section 3 examines the compensation consultant industry while Section 4 discusses 
our data. Our empirical findings are discussed in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.  
2. Literature review 
A number of business managers, academics, and politicians (including Crystal, 1991; 
Murphy, 1999; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, 2004; Buffett, 2006, and Waxman, 2007) contend 
that powerful CEOs use compensation consultants to justify their high compensation levels to 
board members, shareholders, and other stakeholders. These critics argue that executives have 
an incentive to “camouflage” their extraction of rents by the outsider validation of executive 
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pay levels. Indeed, this concern contributed to the SEC’s initial decision to require publicly 
traded corporations with fiscal closings on or after December 15, 2006 to identify and describe 
their use of compensation consultants in their proxy statements. 
Subsequent academic studies have examined the effect of consultants on executive 
compensation levels, using the 2006 ruling to distinguish those firms that use compensation 
consultants solely for compensation advice and those that use such consultants for other 
services. They also examine differences between consultants retained by the board and those 
retained by management, under the premise that the former are more likely to work in the best 
interests of shareholders. Overall, their results are largely inconsistent with the hypothesis that 
consultants are used to validate rent extraction. 
For example, Cadman, Carter, and Hillegeist (2010) distinguish between consultants that 
provide compensation services alone and those that provide non-compensation related advice 
such as advice on pension plans, under the assumption that consultants providing other non-
compensation related services will be economically dependent on revenue that is under the 
control of the CEO. However, they do not find either higher levels of pay or lower pay-
performance sensitivities for clients of these potentially conflicted consultants. Murphy and 
Sandino (2010) distinguish between consultants that are hired by management and those that 
are hired by the board under the presumption that the former are likelier to depend on 
management favor. Contrary to their hypothesis, they find that pay is lower in US firms when 
the consultant works for management, rather than for the board.  
Studies in other countries, notably the UK, have also yielded mixed results. For example, 
using a sample of firms from the US and the UK, Conyon, Peck, and Sadler (2009) find that 
the use of compensation consultants is associated with higher CEO pay after controlling for 
firm characteristics. However, they do not find any relation between the use of consultants with 
potential ex ante conflicts of interest and CEO pay levels. In another study, Goh and Gupta 
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(2010) find that UK executives receive higher salary increases after their firms switch 
compensation consultants. 
 The stability of the firm-consultant relationship has caused researchers to attribute the lack 
of results to omitted variables. For example, Armstrong, Ittner, and Larcker (2012) (AIL) argue 
that while CEO pay is indeed higher in clients of consultant firms than in non-consultant firms, 
this difference is driven by weaker corporate governance at the consultant client firms, not by 
using consultant firms. AIL find no significant difference in CEO pay levels post-2007 after 
controlling for corporate governance characteristics. They interpret this finding as consistent 
with the idea that the costs of high compensation may be offset by the benefits of less intensive 
monitoring such as greater CEO willingness to share private information with the board (e.g., 
Adams and Ferreira, 2007 or Laux, 2008). They also find no evidence of higher CEO pay levels 
at firms that engage multiservice consultants. Murphy and Sandino (2014) document that firms 
with ex ante higher levels and more complex forms of CEO pay (before hiring consultants) are 
more likely to use consultants ex post to advise on pay.  
With the exceptions of Murphy and Sandino (2014) and Li and Zhang (2014), studies on 
the role of compensation consultants in the US typically use one or two years of data 2006-
2007 (the period immediately following the SEC’s December 2006 rule that required proxy 
statements to disclose which consultants provided compensation advice to the firm.) Li and 
Zhang (2014) find no effect of a post-2009 switch to a specialist on firm CEO compensation 
levels. However, they expressly exclude firms that switch from multiservice consultants to 
newly spun-off specialists. Though studies on non-US firms do use longitudinal data, non-US 
CEOs are also typically paid much smaller amounts than US CEOs, weakening the ability of 
tests to detect the role played by consultants.  
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3. The compensation consultant industry and regulatory changes  
Compensation consultants can be distinguished according to the types of services they 
provide. Specifically, compensation-related advice can include an analysis of the compensation 
of the company’s executive officers and board members compared to an appropriate peer 
group. It can also involve the design of pay programs that are in alignment with the company’s 
business strategy and pay philosophy, industry best practices, compensation trends, and market 
survey data. Non-compensation advice can include recommendations related to healthcare and 
pension benefits management, Human Resources (HR) technology/software, or risk 
management. Typically, the consultant is hired by the compensation committee to provide 
compensation advice, while the HR department / management hires the consultant to carry out 
non-compensation consulting services. The HR department /management may also recommend 
executive compensation consultants to the committee. 
Compensation consultants can also be distinguished by whether they have been engaged 
by the board or the firm’s managers. However, this is a noisy measure of the potential for 
conflicts of interests. Bebchuk, Fried and Walker (2002) note that “compensation consultants 
are hired through a company's human resources department, and anecdotal evidence suggests 
that some CEOs are heavily involved in the process” (page 790). “Even if the CEO is not 
normally involved in the selection of the compensation consultant”, they argue, “the threat of 
his involvement the next time - should the consultant suggest a package not to his liking - is 
likely to keep the consultant in line”. Hence, it is not clear that consultants hired by the board 
are relatively unconflicted relative to consultants hired by management. Even if a consultant is 
retained by the board for compensation consulting, management can subsequently influence 
the consultant by paying for other services. Likewise, a multiservice consultant engaged to 
provide only compensation consulting has an incentive to sell additional non-executive 
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compensation services to the firm (potentially through the CEO), even though the firm may not 
be currently paying for any other services.   
Due to the potential conflict of interest in the engagement of multiservice consultants, in 
2009 the SEC proposed additional disclosure rules for firms that hired compensation 
consultants. The SEC received 130 comment letters in response to its proposed amendments, 
with most investors in favor of the amendments and most multiservice consultants against 
them.3,4 Specifically, the multiservice firms argued that the amendments would have a negative 
economic impact on their future business prospects as firms would be discouraged from using 
multiservice compensation consulting firms in more than one capacity.  
After receiving the comment letters, the SEC adopted a modified version of the proposed 
amendments in December 2009 to take effect for all proxy filings after February 2010. The 
modified ruling indicates that if a board’s consultant or its affiliates provide other non-
executive compensation consulting services, the client firm is required to disclose the fees paid 
when the non-executive compensation consulting service fees exceed $120,000 during the 
fiscal year. If the board does not engage the consultant, then the same disclosure is also required 
of consultants that work directly for the company or for management.  
The disclosure change was intended to ensure the independence of compensation 
consultants hired directly by a firm’s compensation committee. The consultant industry, 
especially those multiservice providers most affected by the new disclosure rules, reacted 
quickly to this mandate. In February 2010, a select number of principals and consultants left 
Hewitt Associates, one of the four largest multiservice consultants by market share, to form 
Meridian Compensation Partners LLC, an entity which would operate as an independent 
executive compensation consulting firm. According to the related press release:  
                                                          
3 See for example, letters from AFL-CIO, Frank Inman, Hermes Equity Ownership Services Ltd., TIAA-CREF, 
and Trillium Asset Management. Retrieved from: https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/33-9089.pdf 
4 See for example, letters from ABA, Hewitt, Mercer, Pfizer, Protective Life Corporation, Radford, Towers Perrin, 
Value Alliance, and Watson Wyatt. Retrieved from: https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/33-9089.pdf 
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‘This spin-off keeps those clients’ best interests in mind—they can continue to work 
with their current executive compensation advisor and team, without compromising the 
appearance of independence…At the same time, it creates opportunities for us to expand 
our relationships with those clients that may have felt restricted from engaging Hewitt for 
broader consulting and outsourcing work because we were the executive compensation 
consultant to their board.’5 
Other compensation consultants acted similarly. In 2009, a group of former Mercer partners 
launched Compensation Advisory Partners, their own new executive compensation consulting 
firm while in 2010, Towers Watson announced that it would partner with a newly created spin-
off, Pay Governance LLC. 
Given the resulting structural changes in the compensation consulting industry, the 2009 
SEC ruling presents an opportunity for us to study the relation between a firm’s incentives in 
engaging a compensation consultant and that firm’s CEO pay level. The choice of a 
compensation consultant can either be made by the CEO or the board. Since this choice is 
invisible to the econometrician, prior papers were not able to distinguish firms where the board 
is likely to have made the choice of consultant from firms where the CEO is likely to have 
made the choice.  
We hypothesize that the 2009 rule change acts as a natural separating device that separates 
firms where the CEO made the choice from firms where the board made the choice. Table 1 
sets out our hypotheses for the costs and benefits of each choice and for who is likely to have 
made the choice of consultant. Following the rule change, the firm makes one of three 
decisions: Switch to a related spin-off consultant, switch to an unrelated specialist, or remain 
with a multiservice consultant. Regardless of the actual magnitudes of benefits and costs, only 
                                                          
5 ‘Hewitt Associates announces partial spin-off of its executive compensation consulting business in North 
America,’ February 1, 2010, Business Wire. Retrieved from: 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20100201005487/en/Hewitt-Associates-Announces-Partial-Spin-Off-
Executive-Compensation 
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the first decision – to shift to a related spin-off consultant - has no costs for the CEO and 
potentially some large benefits. We therefore classify this type of switch as likely to have been 
decided by the CEO. Firms characterized by this decision are likely to have weaker corporate 
governance and be prone to agency problems. In contrast, firms that stayed with their existing 
multiservice consultants (and explicitly disclosed the amount of consultant compensation) for 
both executive compensation and other consulting services, seem to offer no incremental 
benefit for the CEO and potentially offer incremental costs. We therefore classify firms that 
remained with multiservice consultants as firms where the board had power over the choice of 
consultant. Finally, firms that switched to unrelated specialists offer some benefits but also 
significantly larger incremental costs. We also classify this switch as likelier to have been made 
by the board than the CEO. 
4. Sample and variables 
4.1. Sample construction 
To examine this relation, we use a sample of 1,051 unique publicly listed firms and 6,241 
firm-years from 2006 to 2012. As in AIL, we exclude firms with fiscal years ending before 
December 2006 to ensure that all firms in our sample are subject to the compensation disclosure 
requirements that took effect on December 15, 2006.  
Our data on compensation consultant usage come from Incentive Lab’s executive 
compensation database. This is a proprietary dataset that provides information from firm proxy 
statement disclosures regarding their compensation consultant usage, including details on 
consultants retained in each fiscal year. From this dataset, we obtain our initial sample of 7,580 
firm-years, of which 6,765 disclose the hiring of a compensation consultant. We then eliminate 
any firm-years that do not have corresponding data in the ExecuComp database (which details 
executive compensation for S&P 1000 firms) to ensure compensation data and CEO 
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characteristics are consistent with the samples in previous studies. The restriction reduces our 
final sample to 1,051 unique firms and 6,241 firm-year observations.  
Table 2 Panel A shows the distribution of consultant and non-consultant firms across the 
sample period. Over our sample period, we find that approximately 90% of ExecuComp firm-
years disclose the use of compensation consultants. This proportion is consistent with that 
found in previous studies on compensation consultants. Furthermore, each year, approximately 
28% of those firms not using compensation consultants in the previous year choose to do so 
for the first time. Around the time of the disclosure rule change, Table 2 Panel A also shows, 
a large proportion of firms switch consultants. Specifically, 33.2% of our firms switch 
consultants in 2009 and 39.6% switch in 2010, in contrast to an average of 29.5% over the 
entire period. Table 2 Panel B shows that no industry dominates the distribution of firms using 
a consultant versus non-consultant firms. 
Table 3 presents our summary statistics for the compensation consultant industry. 
Averaging across yearly averages in Panel A reveals that specialist consultants represented 
38.8% and 60.8% of our sample from 2006-2008 and 2009-2012, respectively. The market 
share of specialist consultants increased every year from 35.4% in 2006 to 70.4% in 2012. Of 
particular note, there appears to be a sharp structural break in the composition of the industry 
in 2010 when the market share of specialist consultants jumped from 44.3% to 59.3%. There 
are several reasons for this break. First, following the 2009 SEC ruling, new specialist firms 
(Pay Governance, Meridian, and Compensation Advisory Partners) were spun-off from 
multiservice providers, accounting for 14.9% of the market in fiscal 2010 and 20.3% by fiscal 
2012. Second, Panel B of Table 3 indicates that existing specialist consultants (Frederic W. 
Cook, Pearl Meyer, Compensia, and Semler Brossy) also enjoyed an increase in market share 
during this time, from 29.1% in fiscal 2008 to 35.6% in fiscal 2012. During this same period, 
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the large multiservice compensation consultants, Towers Watson, Aon Hewitt and Mercer 
dropped from a collective market share of 53.1% in fiscal 2008 to 24.9% in fiscal 2012.  
Table 3 Panel B illustrates this market share evolution at the individual compensation 
consultant level. Before the 2009 SEC disclosure rule change, Towers Watson’s predecessor 
(Towers Perrin), Aon Hewitt’s predecessor (Hewitt & Associates), Frederick W. Cook and 
Mercer each accounted for over 10% of the market, while Pearl Meyer accounted for another 
4.8%. The rest of the market was fragmented. After the 2009 rule change was announced, the 
top three multiservice providers, Towers Watson, Hewitt, and Mercer spun off the 
compensation specialist consultants Pay Governance, Meridian, and Compensation Advisory 
Partners, respectively. Existing large specialist firms Frederic Cook and Pearl Meyer gained 
market share between 2009 and 2012, with Frederic W. Cook becoming the market leader at 
19.7% market share in 2012.  
Finally, the statistics in Table 4 Panel A1 show that, by 2012, 26.8% of those client firms 
affected by the rule change switched to a related spun-off specialist, while Panel A2 shows that 
only 2.6% of unaffected client firms did so. Additionally, we find that client firms that engaged 
multiservice consultants and were required to disclose fees from 2009 onwards reported 
median fees for other services of a magnitude 4.4 times larger than their executive 
compensation consulting fees ($600,435 and $135,380, respectively, reported in Table 4 Panel 
B).  
Taken together, the statistics in Tables 2 and 3 provide preliminary evidence that the 
compensation consultant industry experienced significant structural changes in response to the 
2009 SEC disclosure requirement.  
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4.2. Variables and descriptive statistics 
As in previous studies, our main variable of interest is the total amount of CEO 
compensation at the firm level. To measure CEO compensation, we use the TDC1 variable 
from ExecuComp, which includes salary, bonus, non-equity incentive plan compensation, 
grant-date fair value of stock awards, grant-date fair value of option awards, deferred 
compensation, and other compensation. Note that this definition applies to ExecuComp data 
from 2006 onward. 
In our study, we control for firm, CEO, ownership, and board characteristics that may 
influence both compensation levels and the likelihood of retaining a compensation consultant. 
For firm characteristics, we follow AIL and control for firm size using the natural logarithm of 
market capitalization, log (market capitalization), at the beginning of the fiscal year; the book-
to-market ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year; return on assets for the prior fiscal year 
(ROA), calculated as operating income after depreciation (Compustat OIADP, following the 
convention in the accounting literature) for the prior fiscal year scaled by total assets at the end 
of the prior fiscal year; the change in return on assets (∆ROA) between the current fiscal year 
and the prior fiscal year; and the raw stock return of the prior two fiscal years. Furthermore, 
we control for firm complexity using the natural logarithm of the number of business segments, 
log (# business segments). We also control for firm growth using asset growth and employee 
growth over the prior year. We calculate our accounting variables using data from Compustat 
and our market variables using data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).  
In addition to firm characteristics, we control for several CEO characteristics: the CEO’s 
proportion incentive pay, computed as the proportion of long-term incentive compensation 
(TDC1 - Salary - Bonus) to total compensation; CEO age; CEO tenure; and whether the CEO 
is a new CEO in the current fiscal year. As a measure of the CEO’s equity incentives, we 
calculate the CEO’s firm-related wealth, using the methodology outlined in Daniel, Li, and 
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Naveen (2013) (see also Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2013). In addition, we define Founder 
CEO following the approach of Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011). 
We also control for the ownership structure of the firm, specifically the degree of 
institutional ownership of a firm as well as the number of block holders (defined as the number 
of institutions with 5% or more ownership of outstanding shares), using data obtained from 
Thomson Reuters 13F holdings data. 
Finally, we control for several board characteristics that have typically been used in the 
prior literature as proxies for the strength of corporate governance at the firm. These include 
the size of the board of directors, board size; the proportion of board members who are 
independent directors, % independent board; the proportion of board members who also serve 
on another board, % board busy; the proportion of board members who are at least 69 years of 
age, % board old; whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board, CEO is Chairman; 
whether board members have staggered election terms, staggered board; and finally whether 
there is more than one class of shares, dual class shares. We also control for the proportion of 
board members who have joined since the CEO’s tenure began at the firm (% board appointed 
by CEO), since these are likely to be board members over which the CEO had influence 
(Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002; Armstrong, Jagolinzer and Larcker, 2010). 
Since the consultant’s advice to the board is typically delivered to the compensation 
committee, we further control for the following characteristics of the compensation committee: 
the proportion of committee members who serve on another committee or board, Comp. 
committee % busy; the proportion of committee members who are at least 69 years of age, % 
old; and the number of members on the compensation committee, size. With the exception of 
our CEO is Chairman variable, which is collected from ExecuComp, all other governance 
variables are calculated using data collected from the RiskMetrics Directors and Governance 
datasets. (See Appendix II for data definitions.) 
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As mentioned, we classify the compensation consultants in our study by whether they 
provide other consulting services in addition to compensation consulting. Specialist consultants 
provide only a narrow range of compensation-related services and include the following firms: 
Pay Governance, Meridian, Frederic W. Cook, Compensation Advisory Partners, Pearl Meyer, 
Compensia, Semler Brossy, and Exequity6. In contrast, multiservice consultants provide a 
range of human resource (HR) and other services in addition to compensation consulting and 
include the following firms: Towers Watson (and predecessors Towers Perrin, and Watson 
Wyatt), Aon Hewitt (and predecessors), Mercer and Radford, McLagan and Hay7. Appendix I 
details how we classify a firm’s switch to a related specialist consultant. 
Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics for our sample. From Panel A, we see that firms 
that use compensation consultants are, on average, larger, more complex (as measured by the 
number of business segments), and have lower asset and employee growth than those that do 
not hire compensation consultants, but are otherwise similar in terms of most other firm 
characteristics. We find no statistically significant differences in the level of institutional 
ownership between consultant client-firms and those that do not engage such consultants. 
However, the statistics in Panel A show that the two sets of firms differ substantially on CEO 
and corporate governance characteristics. Specifically, CEOs of firms employing consultants 
earn higher pay, of which there is a higher proportion of incentive pay, and that they have lower 
firm-related wealth. In terms of board characteristics, while these firms are less likely to have 
dual class shares, they are more likely to have a staggered board. Firms that retain consultants 
have larger boards, a higher proportion of independent directors, and a higher proportion of 
busy directors. Turning to the compensation committee more specifically, firms with 
consultants have significantly younger, busier, and larger compensation committees. 
                                                          
6 Exequity is not tabulated in Table 3 as it is not one of the top 15 firms by market share. 
7 Radford, McLagan, and Hay is not tabulated in Table 3 as it is not one of the top 15 firms by market share. 
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Panel B of Table 5 presents the summary statistics for our subsample of firms that change 
compensation consultants on or after 2009. Overall, firms that switch to related specialist 
consultants (column 2) are, on average, larger but less complex. They have higher stock 
performance the year prior to the switch and lower operating performance than firms that stay 
with multiservice consultants (column 1). Firms that switch to related specialists appear to have 
lower institutional ownership and fewer block holders than those who do not change 
consultants. Regarding CEO characteristics, firms that switch to related specialists have CEOs 
who are older, have been with the firm for a shorter period, and have a higher proportion of 
their compensation tied to incentives and firm-related wealth. Regarding board structure, these 
firms have boards that are larger, older, busier, and more independent. Overall, our summary 
statistics appear to show a similar pattern for consultant-client and non-consultant-client firms 
as that found in previous literature, and offer preliminary evidence that weaker governance 
does appear to affect the switch to consultant-spinoff matches that might help increase 
compensation ex post. 
Finally, in untabulated correlation results, we find that compensation is strongly correlated 
with consultant use, firm size, firm profitability, the CEO pay mix, and firm-related wealth. 
However, it is inversely correlated with a firm’s book-to-market ratio. We also find that total 
compensation is positively and significantly correlated with board size, the proportion of 
independent directors on the board, the proportion of board members who are busy, and 
whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board.  
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Compensation consultant use and CEO pay 
We first examine why firms choose to engage compensation consultants. In previous 
research, AIL find that controlling for economic and corporate governance characteristics 
mitigates any difference in the level of CEO pay at firms that use compensation consultants. In 
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other words, the hiring of compensation consultants can be seen as a manifestation of weaker 
corporate governance at the firms that hire them. Since the CEOs at these firms would receive 
a higher level of pay regardless of whether they engage compensation consultants, the hiring 
of such consultants prior to the rule change was likely used to provide external validation of a 
CEO’s compensation level to the firm’s board. This argument is consistent with our finding 
that firms with consultants also tend to have larger boards, a higher proportion of independent 
directors, and a higher proportion of busy directors.  
To examine the incentives in choosing to engage a compensation consultant, we follow 
AIL’s methodology in matching treatment samples of those firms that hire compensation 
consultants with samples of those that do not, using propensity scores of the likelihood of 
having a compensation consultant calculated from a combination of economic and corporate 
governance factors. Specifically, we pair each treatment firm-year with one control firm-year 
(in the same year), using caliper matching (with a caliper of 0.05, without replacement). After 
matching, we then compare the covariates between the treatment and control groups with a 
two-sample t-test and a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. In those cases where the 
propensity-based matching yields unbalanced covariates, we calibrate by requiring the 
covariates to be within a similar neighborhood. This process slightly reduces our overall sample 
size. The number (N) of matched-pairs is reported in tables 6 and 7. 
Table 6 presents the results from our logistic regression on the determinants of consultant 
use. Following AIL, we present the results on the determinants of whether a firm uses a 
compensation consultant in column 1. Consistent with prior research, we find that firms that 
hire compensation consultants tend to be those with lower operating performance and greater 
reliance on long-term incentive pay. Firms that use compensation consultants also tend to have 
CEOs who have a shorter tenure, and lower existing firm-related wealth. We also find that at 
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compensation consultant client firms, boards tend to be larger and more independent while 
members of the compensation committee are younger and busier.  
We investigate the determinants of firms switching to a related spun-off consultant rather 
than staying with the existing multiservice consultant in column (2). We find that larger, slower 
growth, and less profitable firms that pay a bigger proportion of incentive compensation tend 
to switch from their multiservice consultants to related, spun-off specialists. These switching 
firms also have busier compensation committees and lower institutional ownership. These 
results are consistent with the idea that firms where CEO’s influence on boards is higher tend 
to switch to the related, spun-off specialists.  
We further examine the firms’ choice set in a multinomial ordered logistic regression. We 
use an ordered logit in preference to a standard multinomial logit because Table 1 suggests the 
likelihood that the CEO chooses the consultant (rather than the board) decreases monotonically 
from the decision to switch to a related spun-off consultant to switching to an unrelated 
consultant to staying with the multiservice consultant. In the ordered logistic regression, the 
baseline is therefore whether the firm switches to a related spinoff specialist. For ease of 
interpretation, we code the dependent variable as zero if the firm switches to a related specialist, 
1 if it switches to an unrelated specialist, and 2 if it stays with the multiservice consultant. The 
results presented in column (3) of Table 6 indicate that firms that are smaller, and higher growth 
firms with fewer segments are more likely to stay with multiservice consultants. These firms 
also have older CEOs and a lower proportion of incentive pay. In terms of governance 
characteristics, and consistent with the idea that firms that choose to stay with multiservice 
consultants (and disclose both executive compensation and other consulting fees) have better 
governance, these firms have higher institutional ownership and their compensation committee 
members are less busy.  
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We next evaluate the efficacy of our matching algorithm by examining the covariate 
balance between the matched pairs within each consultant category. The results in Table 7 
Panel A show that our two matched groups (after matching using model (1) in Table 6) appear 
similar with respect to their observable contracting environments. The results in Table 7 Panel 
B show that CEO pay is significantly higher at firms with consultants even after controlling for 
firm, CEO, and governance characteristics (mean and median differences of 22.29% and 
21.40%, respectively, significant at 1% confidence levels).8  
We then decompose total compensation into salary and benefits (total compensation minus 
cash-incentive, and equity based pay), cash-incentive (non-equity incentives and bonus), and 
equity (option and stock awards) categories. To mitigate potential outlier effects, we discuss 
median differences in the text. Panel B shows that the salary and benefits earned by CEOs at 
firms that use compensation consultants is higher by a median 3.55% while equity pay is higher 
by a median 15.49%, statistically significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, we find that firms 
that use compensation consultants provide greater proportions of incentive and equity incentive 
pay but are similar to non-consultant firms in stock returns, ROA, employees, and asset growth. 
We also test whether firms with compensation consultants are likely to have more complex 
compensation contracts for lower-ranking employees by comparing the percentage of CEO and 
top 5 executive option pay as a percentage of the firms’ total stock option expense. If a firm 
has more widespread stock-based incentive compensation for employees, the share of CEO and 
top 5 executive option pay should be smaller. We do not find a statistically significant 
difference in the share of CEO and top 5 executive option pay between the consultant client 
firms and matched firms.9 
                                                          
8 In contrast, AIL find that for a sample of S&P1500 firms in 2006, the difference in total compensation between 
consultant client firms and matched firms is not statistically significant after controlling for governance 
characteristics in the propensity-score matching procedure. 
9 An additional possibility is that consultants are specifically hired by firms with hard-to-value tasks such as 
repricing underwater options (perhaps because restructuring these options are complex). If this were true, we 
should find that there should be significant differences between firms that hire consultants and those that do not 
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Based on our results, and contrary to previous studies, we conclude that CEO pay levels at 
firms that use compensation consultants are economically and statistically significantly higher 
than those at firms that do not use consultants.10 However, given the nuanced pay proportion 
differences described above, our results can be interpreted as evidence of the existence of either 
rent extraction or optimal compensation incentives.  
5.2. Multiservice versus specialist consultants 
We next turn our attention to the relation between executive compensation and the type of 
consultant used by a firm. Previous research (e.g., Crystal, 1991; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004) 
posits that multiservice compensation consultants may be influenced by managers who have 
the opportunity to engage these consultants for other services. Indeed, this possibility 
influenced the 2009 SEC ruling requiring disclosure when the non-compensation consulting 
fees paid to a multiservice consultant exceed $120,000 for the year. 
To avoid disclosing these fees after the ruling, clients of multiservice firms had the choice 
of using a specialist consultant for executive compensation advice while using a multiservice 
consultant for other services. In other words, client firms that engaged multiservice consultants 
for both executive compensation services and other services before 2009 could choose to 
switch to either a related, newly spun-off specialist consultant or an unrelated specialist for 
executive compensation advice while using the same or another multiservice consultant. 
Alternatively, the client firm could remain with the existing multiservice firm for both 
                                                          
in the level of underwater options in the firm. Since we do not know when the options were granted (and hence 
do not know when the options are underwater), we assume a three-year vesting period and compare the stock price 
decline for the firm in 2008 relative to its 2005-2007 average (Price in 2008 Relative to 2005-2007 Average). 
Consistent with this hypothesis, firms that employee compensation consultants do appear to have significantly 
greater price declines than firms who do not hire consultants. 
10 Since our matched-pairs methodology reduces our sample size, we also regress total CEO compensation on 
firm, CEO, and governance characteristics plus an indicator variable that equals 1 for consultant client firms on 
our full sample. In this analysis, we include industry and year fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the firm 
level. The untabulated results, using the full sample of 6,056 firm years, indicate that the coefficient of consultant 
usage in the regression using the natural logarithm of total compensation as the dependent variable is 0.30 (p-
value <0.01).  
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compensation consulting and other services and, as noted above, disclose consultant 
compensation if fees for other services exceeded $120,000. (See Appendix I for switching 
definitions.) 
We hypothesize that firms that originally used multiservice consultants to influence 
executive compensation advice upwards should react to the 2009 ruling by switching to spun-
off specialists. In contrast, firms that did not use multiservice consultants to influence executive 
compensation should react to the 2009 ruling by either switching to unrelated specialists or 
remaining with their multiservice consultants.  
The results in Table 8 Panels A1 and A2 show that the difference in total pay between the 
treatment group of those who stay with their consultants and the control group of propensity-
score matched switchers is significant both before and after 2009.11 Specifically, we find that 
CEOs at firms that remain with multiservice consultants earn a 13.68% lower median pay 
before 2009 and a 18.32% lower median pay after 2009 than their peers that switch to related 
specialist consultants after 2009. When total pay is further decomposed into salary and benefits, 
cash-incentive compensation, and equity pay, firms that switch to related specialists award 
higher CEO pay in all three categories, even though firm performance does not consistently 
differ across the treatment and matched samples. Importantly, while the dollar amount of 
incentive pay was higher for CEOs at these firms, the proportion of incentive pay is not 
significantly different. Specifically, while the proportion of incentive pay for firms that 
switched to related spun-off consultants was 1.3 percentage points higher prior to 2009, the 
difference is no longer statistically significant after 2009.  Table 8 Panels A1 and A2 also shows 
that other compensation practices such as CEO deferred compensation and options, as well as 
                                                          
11 Untabulated results indicate that our two matched groups have similar covariates for the propensity-score 
matching variables that describe firm, CEO, and governance characteristics. We obtain similar results if we 
exclude firms with founder CEOs from the sample. 
. 
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firms’ option pay to the top 5 executives and employees do not seem to differ across the 
treatment and control groups.  
These results support the hypothesis that at least some firms use compensation consultants 
to justify executive pay, even when such pay packages are less closely aligned with shareholder 
interests. Anecdotal evidence supports this hypothesis. In a number of instances after the 2009 
ruling, compensation consultants who enjoyed an especially close relationship with a firm’s 
management chose to join specialist firms.12  
As a robustness check, we also compare CEO pay at stayers against unrelated switchers. 
Consistent with our expectations, the results in Table 8 Panels B1 and B2 show that there are 
no significant differences in total and non-incentive compensation levels in this setting either 
before or after the 2009 disclosure rule change. Firms that retain their multiservice 
compensation consultants after the 2009 ruling, compared to those that switch to unrelated 
specialists, have lower cash incentive pay levels and higher equity incentive pay proportions 
prior to 2009, and lower equity pay levels after 2009. These results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that the switchers to unrelated specialists potentially did so to re-align compensation 
component choices between cash incentive pay and equity based incentive compensation, and 
that these switchers are unlikely to have switched to enable CEO rent extraction13. Note that 
                                                          
12 For example, the following explanation on consultant turnover is extracted from the fiscal 2009 proxy statement 
for Scientific Games Corporation: 
‘The Committee has in the past retained Mercer LLC (‘Mercer’) as its outside compensation consultant. In October 
2009, the Committee determined to instead engage Compensation Advisory Partners LLC, as the consultant from 
Mercer that had traditionally worked with the Committee moved to Compensation Advisory Partners LLC. In 
addition, the Committee believed this change would eliminate any appearance that the advice received from its 
outside compensation consultant is not independent, since Compensation Advisory Partners LLC provides no 
services to the Company other than those provided to the Committee, whereas Mercer has been engaged by 
management to provide health and welfare, pension and general compensation consulting services (“Other 
Services”).’ 
Hence Scientific Games Corporation chose to continue working with the lead consultant from Mercer on executive 
compensation consulting after the individual moved to a specialist firm but chose to retain Mercer for other 
services. 
13 In addition, the proportion of CEO deferred compensation at firms that remain with multiservice compensation 
consultants after 2009 is higher than those that switch to unrelated specialists. The median differences in the 
proportion of CEO deferred compensation is statistically significant (10% confidence levels prior to 2009 and 5% 
confidence levels post 2009), but are not economically significant (less than 0.1 percentage points). 
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we use the stayers as the treatment group in both Panels A and B to ensure that the same group 
of firms is compared to the related and unrelated switchers, respectively. 
The difference in differences for median values of total and component compensation 
levels between the matched groups in Table 8 are not statistically significant between the pre 
and post 2009 periods. This suggests that prior to the rule change, some firms employing 
multiservice consultants were already paying their executives significantly smaller salaries but 
these firms could not be distinguished from firms that overpaid their executives without a way 
to separate the two types. Taken together, these results from Table 8 support our conjecture 
that the differences in pay before the rule change could have been driven either by the optimal 
contracting hypothesis or the rent extraction hypothesis. The rule change acted as a separating 
device distinguishing firms that switch to related spun-off specialists to obtain favourable pay 
advice from those that stayed with existing multi-service consultants or switched to unrelated 
specialists.  
5.3. CEO pay effects from the initial use of consultants 
In addition to allowing us to better understand the effect of the 2009 ruling on executive 
compensation levels, our panel data from 2006-2012 also enables us to relate changes in pay 
to the initial adoption of consultants. This in turn helps alleviate concerns over correlated 
omitted variables. In one previous study examining the adoption of compensation consultants, 
Goh and Gupta (2010) find no significant relationship between first-time compensation 
consultant hiring and executive director pay changes for a sample of UK firms. In a study of 
US firms, Cadman, Carter, and Hillegeist (2010) find preliminary evidence that adding 
compensation consultants is not associated with pay increases for CEOs. However, it should 
be noted that there are only 24 firms that started hiring consultants in 2007 in their sample. In 
contrast, in our expanded sample, we have 106 firms that started hiring consultants during our 
sample period. Thus, we are able to obtain matched control firms based on firm, CEO, and 
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governance characteristics. We exclude firm-years when a new CEO is hired, as this event may 
introduce an endogenous bias regarding CEO pay.14 Finally, to explore whether the initial 
hiring of a compensation consultant is associated with a higher increase in total pay, we 
compare the total pay of our treatment and propensity-score matched samples. 
Table 9 presents the results from our matched-pairs analysis of compensation changes and 
initial adoption of consultants for the full 2006-2012 longitudinal dataset.15 The results indicate 
that the mean difference in total compensation change upon compensation consultant adoption 
is 15.98%, and the difference is statistically significant at the 5% confidence level (the median 
difference is not statistically significant at the 10% confidence level)16. In particular, mean 
(median) change in equity pay is 19.93% (2.14%) and the change is statistically significant at 
5% (10%) confidence levels and the mean (median) change in equity pay as a proportion of 
total pay is 6.9 percentage points (0.3 percentage points). There are no significant differences 
in total and sub-category compensation levels and proportions before the adoption of 
compensation consultants and that firm performance measures are largely not statistically 
significantly different across the matched samples. Firms may also hire compensation 
consultants due to a need for overall employee compensation advice. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, employee growth at firms that adopt compensation consultants is on average 4.1 
percentage points higher than the control group, and the difference is statistically significant at 
the 5% confidence level (though the median difference is insignificant). When we decompose 
total compensation into its non-incentive, cash-incentive, and equity components, we find that 
the median difference in compensation changes after the adoption of a compensation consultant 
                                                          
14 Including these firm-years does not change our results. 
15 Untabulated analysis shows that the mean and median covariates in terms of firm, CEO, and governance 
characteristics between the treatment and control groups are not significantly different. 
16 We also rerun our analyses using the regression approach employed by Cadman, Carter, and Hillegeist (2010) 
and Goh and Gupta (2010). This approach yields a coefficient of 0.15 for our indicator variable (initial adoption 
of a compensation consultant) from an untabulated regression where the dependent variable is the change in 
logged total compensation. 
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appears to be largely driven by an increase in the proportion of the equity component of pay 
(6.9 percentage mean and 0.3% median), a result that is consistent with pay being more closely 
tied to shareholder value. While there is no difference in CEO’s deferred compensation as a 
proportion of total compensation pre-adoption, the deferred compensation proportion 
decreased by a mean of 0.7 percentage points which is significant at the 5% confidence level 
(median change is statistically insignificant) upon the hiring of compensation consultants. As 
discussed previously, the 2009 rule change acts as a natural separating device to separate firms 
that are likely to be driven by rent extraction from those who contract optimally with their 
CEOs. Firms that initially hire compensation consultants do not necessarily fall into either 
bucket and hence it is not surprising that we find evidence of optimal contracting in this setting. 
Since firms have different reasons to start hiring compensation consultants, the initial adoption 
of compensation consultants appears to provide evidence for both rent extraction and optimal 
contracting. Our evidence shows the difficulty prior research has had in distinguishing client 
firms that use compensation consultants to justify higher pay from those that use consultants 
to structure optimal contracts.  
6. Conclusions 
While a number of studies have examined the effect of compensation consultants on overall 
executive pay levels, this research has largely focused on the one- or two-year period 
surrounding the 2006 SEC ruling that firms identify their compensation consultants in their 
proxy statements. This limited sample timeframe may explain why previous research has found 
little evidence that using compensation consultants leads to higher CEO pay at firms.  
In our paper, we expand our timeframe to the period between 2006 and 2012. Using a 
dataset of over 1,000 firms, we analyze the relation between consultant use and CEO pay. In 
addition, we use the 2009 SEC ruling on the disclosure of non-compensation consulting fees 
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as a natural device to separate the firms in our study based on their incentives in the choice of 
a compensation consultant. 
We show that firms that switch to a spun-off specialist after the 2009 ruling pay their CEOs 
significantly more than do a matched sample of firms that remain with their multiservice 
consultants. We interpret this finding as evidence that firms that switch to spun-off specialists 
are motivated by a desire to obtain favorable compensation advice. Over our entire sample 
period, we find that firms experience a significant increase in CEO pay when they initially hire 
a compensation consultant relative to a propensity-score matched sample, but the increase in 
total pay is largely due to higher equity based incentive pay. Overall, our study provides new 
and more nuanced empirical evidence that some firms adopt compensation consultants to 
design optimal pay packages whereas other firms use compensation consultants as a 
justification for higher executive pay levels. On a broader level, our findings suggest that not 
all multiservice consultants are conflicted and not all specialist consultants are guardians of 
shareholder value.  
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Appendix I. Switching Definitions. 
Switch to a Related Specialist Consultant 
For the matched pairs analysis in Table 8A, a firm is defined as switching to a related specialist consultant in 
2009 or after if: 
a) the firm retains Towers Watson (or one of its predecessors) and no other specialist consultant, and 
in the following period retains Pay Governance as a compensation consultant; or 
b) the firm retains Hewitt and no other specialist consultant, and in the following period retains 
Meridian as a compensation consultant; or 
c) the firm retains Mercer and no other specialist consultant, and in the following period retains 
Compensation Advisory Partners as a compensation consultant. 
This variable is calculated every fiscal year from 2009, and rolled such that once a firm switches to a related 
specialist consultant, this variable = 1 in every subsequent fiscal year. 
A firm is defined as staying with the same multiservice consultant if it retains the same multiservice consultant 
in a given fiscal year from 2009 onwards as it did in 2008 (including predecessor firms). For example, if a 
firm retained Mercer and no other specialist consultants in 2008, and in 2009 retained Mercer and no other 
specialist consultants, it would be classified as staying with the same multiservice consultant. 
This variable is calculated every fiscal year from 2009, and rolled such that once a firm no longer meets the 
above criteria, the variable switches to zero and stays at zero in every subsequent fiscal year. 
 
- 30 - 
 
Appendix II. Data Definitions. 
Firm characteristics 
Log (Market capitalization) is the natural logarithm of market capitalization at the beginning of the fiscal year.  
Book-to-market is the book value of equity divided by market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year.  
ROA is net income divided by end-of-year total assets for the prior fiscal year.  
∆ROA is equal to ROA from this fiscal year minus ROA from the previous fiscal year.  
Stock return (t-1) is the stock price return over the previous fiscal year.  Stock return (t-2) is the stock price return over 
the fiscal year two periods ago.  
Log (# business segments) is the natural logarithm of the number of business segments or operating segments in 
Compustat with positive, non-missing revenue.  
Asset growth is the natural logarithm of total assets divided by prior year total assets.  
Employee growth is the natural logarithm of number of employees divided by prior year number of employees.  
Compensation characteristics 
Total compensation is the TDC1 variable from ExecuComp for the current fiscal year.  
Non-incentive compensation is total compensation minus cash-incentive and equity-based pay from ExecuComp, for 
the current fiscal year.  
Cash incentive compensation is the sum of non-equity incentives and bonus, from ExecuComp for the current fiscal 
year.  
Equity compensation is the sum of the fair value of option awards and stock awards, from ExecuComp for the current 
fiscal year.  
Proportion Incentive Pay is long-term incentive pay (TDC1 - salary - bonus) as a proportion of total compensation. 
Proportion Equity Pay is CEO's equity incentive pay as a proportion of total compensation.  
Options as a % of Equity Pay is CEO's option-based compensation as a proportion of total equity (option + equity) 
compensation.  
Log (firm-related wealth) is the natural logarithm of the value of the CEO’s stock and option portfolio, calculated as per 
Daniel, Li, and Naveen (2013).  
CEO Deferred Comp (% of Total Comp) is the firm's contribution to CEO's deferred compensation plans as a proportion 
of total compensation.  
CEO Options (% of Firm's Total Option Exp.) is the CEO's Option Compensation as a proportion of the firm's total 
option expense (i.e., value of options paid to all employees).  
Top 5 Exec Options (% of Firm's Total Option Exp.) is the sum of option Compensation paid to top 5 executives as a 
proportion of the firm's total option expense (i.e., value of options paid to all employees).  
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Log (CEO's Options Avg. Remaining Vesting Period) is the natural logarithm of the average remaining vesting period 
of the CEO's options held.  
CEO characteristics 
Founder CEO is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is the founder of the firm.  
CEO age is the CEO’s age in years.  
CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has been in his current role.  
New CEO is a dummy variable equal to one if there was a change in CEO during the fiscal year.  
Ownership characteristics 
Institutional ownership is the percentage of outstanding shares held by institutions at the end of the prior fiscal year.  
Block holder is the number of institutions with 5% or more ownership of outstanding shares at the end of the prior fiscal 
year. 
Board characteristics 
% independent board is the proportion of board members who are independent.  
Board size is equal to the number of board members.  
% board busy is the percentage of board members who serve on another board.  
% board old is the percentage of board members who are at least 69 years old. 
CEO is Chairman is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board.  
Dual class shares is equal to one if the firm has multiple classes of shares according to RiskMetrics and zero otherwise.  
Staggered board is equal to one if board members’ terms are staggered according to RiskMetrics and zero otherwise.  
% board appointed by CEO is the percentage of board members who have joined since the CEO’s tenure at the firm. 
Compensation committee characteristics 
Comp. committee % busy, % old, and size are the percentage of busy and old (described above) members of the 
compensation committee, and the number of board members in the compensation committee.  
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Table 1. Benefits and Costs Analysis for Switching Compensation Consultants. 
  Benefits Costs 
Choice 
made 
by Type of firm 
Variables of 
interest 
Switch to related 
spin-off 
 Benefit for CEO: No fee 
disclosure: No need to disclose fees 
for any compensation consulting 
services (executive or other). 
 Benefit for CEO: Appearance of 
independence: Give the appearance 
of independence in seeking 
executive compensation advice 
 Benefit for CEO: Maintain 
relationship: Retain executive 
compensation consultant partner 
with existing relationship that left 
for spin-off firm; may still be able 
to influence executive 
compensation recommendation with 
contracts for other services. 
 Benefit for board: Compensation 
consultant is familiar with firm 
 Benefit for board if under CEO 
influence: Appearance of 
independence 
 Cost for CEO: None 
 Cost for board: May lose cross-
learning and efficiency benefits 
from having all HR related 
services provided by one main 
consultant 
CEO  Weak 
corporate  
governance 
 Likely to 
be prone to 
agency 
problems 
 Corporate 
governance 
variables  
 CEO power 
variables 
 Incentive 
compensation 
variables 
 Other pay 
variables 
Switch to unrelated 
specialist 
 Benefits for CEO: No fee 
disclosure: No need to disclose fees 
for any compensation consulting 
services (executive or other). 
 Benefits for board: Independent 
advice: New compensation 
consultant partner, cross-selling not 
possible. 
 Cost for CEO: Need to influence 
new compensation consultant 
partner. Have no access to cross-
selling incentives for increasing 
influence 
 Cost for board: May lose cross-
learning and efficiency benefits 
from having all HR related 
services provided by one main 
consultant 
Board Potentially 
fewer agency 
problems 
Variables above 
and firm 
characteristics 
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Remain with 
multiservice 
consultant 
  
 Benefit for CEO: None 
 Benefit for board: Keep cross-
learning and efficiency benefits 
from having all HR related services 
provided by one main consultant  
 Benefit for board: Full disclosure 
of compensation to consultant 
suggests transparency 
 Cost for CEO: Lose relationship 
with executive compensation 
consultant partner with existing 
relationship that left for spin-off 
firm 
 Cost for CEO: Increased 
transparency: Fee disclosure 
 Cost for board: Lose appearance 
of independence in seeking 
executive compensation advice 
Board Potentially 
fewer agency 
problems 
  
Firm 
characteristics 
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Table 2. Sample composition 
The sample is comprised of the intersection of firms in the Incentive Lab executive compensation database and in ExecuComp. A firm is recorded as using a 
compensation consultant in a given fiscal year if the firm has an associated compensation consultant in the Incentive Lab dataset. A firm is recorded as 
starting to use a compensation consultant if it uses a consultant in the current year, and did not in the previous year. A firm is recorded as changing 
compensation consultant if it adds, drops, or swaps a consultant, with respect to the previous year. 
Panel A: Sample composition by year 2006¹ 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 All 
         
Firm uses compensation consultant  688   869   863   840   840   818   774   5,692  
Firm does not use compensation consultant  76   90   85   96   83   68   51   549  
Total firms  764   959   948   936   923   886   825   6,241  
         
% firms with consultants  90.1% 90.6% 91.0% 89.7% 91.0% 92.3% 93.8% 91.2% 
% firms that start using a consultant² 43.4% 25.6% 27.1% 26.0% 24.1% 25.0% 28.3% 
% firms that change consultant³  30.6% 27.7% 33.2% 39.6% 27.1% 18.0% 29.5% 
 
Panel B: Sample composition by industry⁴   Consultant used       No consultant used 
Consumer non-durables   363  6.4%     20  3.6% 
Consumer durables   97  1.7%     17  3.1% 
Manufacturing   674  11.8%     38  6.9% 
Energy   303  5.3%     24  4.4% 
Chemicals   194  3.4%     -  0.0% 
Business equipment   935  16.4%     136  24.8% 
Telecoms   174  3.1%     26  4.7% 
Utilities   368  6.5%     1  0.2% 
Wholesale & retail   532  9.3%     86  15.7% 
Healthcare   413  7.3%     9  1.6% 
Financial   1,021  17.9%     125  22.8% 
Other   618  10.9%     67  12.2% 
   5,692  100%     549  100% 
(1) Our 2006 sample excludes firms with a fiscal year end before December - SEC executive pay rules requiring disclosure of compensation consultants came into force for 
fiscal years ending on or after 15 December 2006. 
(2) As a percentage of firms which did not use a consultant in the previous fiscal year. 
(3) As a percentage of firms which use a consultant in the current and previous fiscal year. 
(4) Industry definitions are based on 12 Industry Portfolios from Ken French’s website.
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Table 3. Compensation consultant market share 
This table reports compensation consultant market share based on number of clients, for each fiscal year from 2006 to 2012. Multiservice firms are denoted by 
M. Specialist compensation consulting firms are denoted by S. Specialist firms that were spun-off by a multiservice parent are denoted by *. Firms are ordered 
by market share in 2006. 
Panel A: Compensation consulting industry statistics 2006 2007 2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  
Number of compensation consultants   85   103   80   78   75   73   67  
Herfindahl index of market share  0.113 0.108 0.108 0.092 0.083 0.082 0.086 
Market share of specialist consultants  35.4% 39.6% 41.3% 44.3% 59.3% 69.0% 70.4% 
Market share of multiservice consultants  64.6% 60.4% 58.7% 55.7% 40.7% 31.0% 29.6% 
 
Panel B: Top 15 Firms   2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Towers Watson & predecessors1 M 26.7% 25.7% 24.9% 23.6% 17.0% 11.8% 10.9% 
      Pay Governance *    0.2% 6.7% 8.6% 8.8% 
Aon Hewitt, associated co's and predecessors2 M 16.5% 15.7% 16.5% 16.4% 10.3% 7.6% 7.3% 
      Meridian *    0.4% 6.4% 8.1% 8.9% 
Frederic W. Cook S 15.6% 16.8% 18.5% 16.7% 16.5% 18.7% 19.7% 
Mercer M 14.8% 13.3% 11.7% 10.2% 8.3% 6.8% 6.7% 
      Compensation Advisory Partners *    1.1% 1.8% 2.6% 2.6% 
Pearl Meyer S 5.5% 5.5% 4.8% 5.3% 6.6% 7.7% 8.0% 
Hay Group M 2.4% 2.0% 2.1% 2.0% 2.0% 2.5% 2.1% 
Compensia S 1.8% 2.6% 2.6% 3.5% 4.0% 4.3% 4.1% 
Deloitte M 1.7% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.4% 1.0% 1.0% 
Semler Brossy S 1.7% 2.2% 3.2% 3.4% 3.1% 3.4% 3.8% 
Buck Consultants M 0.9% 0.4% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 
PricewaterhouseCoopers M 0.8% 1.1% 0.7% 0.6% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 
Ernst & Young M 0.7% 0.6% 0.7% 0.6% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 
Total   89.1% 87.4% 87.6% 85.9% 85.6% 84.0% 85.2% 
(1) Includes Towers Perrin, Watson Wyatt, and Towers Watson. 
(2) Includes Hewitt & Associates, Aon, Aon Hewitt, Radford, and McLagan. 
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Table 4. Compensation consultant switching behavior and fees disclosure in response to 2009 rule change. 
Panel A. This panel reports the evolution of compensation consultant use and switching behavior after the disclosure rule change. Panel A1 shows firms that 
used one multiservice compensation consultant in 2008. From 2009 onwards, we calculate the percentage of firms that (a) stay with the same consultant, (b) 
switch to another multiservice consultant, (c) switch to an unrelated specialist compensation consultant, (d) switch to a related spin-off consultant (e.g. from 
Towers Watson to Pay Governance), and (e) switch to an unrelated spin-off (e.g. to Pay Governance, from Mercer). Panel A2 shows firm that used one 
specialist compensation consultant in 2008. From 2009 onwards, we calculate the percentage of firms that (a) continue to use an unrelated specialist 
consultant, (b) switch to a multiservice consultant, and (c) switch to one of the new spin-off specialist compensation consultants. 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Panel A1: Firm uses one multiservice consultant in 2008 (n=453)    
Stay with same multiservice consultant 71.1% 35.5% 29.3% 27.2% 
Switch to another multiservice consultant 2.0% 0.9% 2.7% 5.3% 
Switch to unrelated pre-existing specialist 12.4% 25.1% 27.9% 29.3% 
Switch to related spun-off specialist 3.1% 25.6% 27.1% 26.8% 
Switch to unrelated spun-off specialist 0.2% 3.2% 5.4% 6.8% 
Other (e.g. specialist AND multiservice) 11.3% 9.7% 7.6% 4.6% 
     
Panel A2: Firm uses one specialist consultant in 2008 (n=301)    
Stay with / switch to another unrelated specialist 88.0% 81.8% 80.6% 78.5% 
Switch to a multiservice consultant 2.7% 1.7% 3.2% 3.6% 
Switch to a spun-off specialist 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 2.6% 
Other (e.g. specialist AND multiservice) 9.3% 16.4% 15.8% 15.3% 
 
Panel B. This panel shows disclosed fees for executive compensation consulting services (CC) and for other non-executive compensation services (Other). The 
data include fiscal years from 2009 onwards after the SEC disclosure rule change was effected for multiservice consultant client firms.  
Fees reported: N Mean Median St. Dev. Min.  Max. 
CC Fees 415 170,119 135,380 144,925 6,400 1,049,500 
Other Fees  1,512,441 600,435 2,415,137 2,879 14,928,178 
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Table 5. Full sample descriptive statistics. 
Panel A shows the summary statistics for two groups: firm-years that use a compensation consultant 
and firm-years that do not use a compensation consultant. The sample spans a period from 2006 to 
2012. Panel B shows statistics for the sample from 2009 onwards (after the disclosure change) for 
firms that used a multiservice consultant before 2009 and continued to use a multiservice consultant 
(1), compared to those that switched to a related spin-off specialist consultant (2).*, **, and *** 
represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, for a Kruskall-Wallis test between 
(1) and (2). The variables are defined in Appendix II. 
Panel A: Full Sample       
  Consultant  No consultant 
Kruskal-
Wallis 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev.   Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. p-value 
Firm characteristics         
Log (Market capitalization) 8.560 8.406 1.309  8.217 8.156 1.479 0.000 
Book-to-market 0.524 0.440 1.072  0.587 0.464 0.611 0.285 
ROA 0.095 0.086 0.092  0.100 0.082 0.112 0.489 
∆ROA (t-1) 0.000 0.002 0.055  -0.003 -0.001 0.069 0.045 
Stock return (t-1) 0.129 0.083 0.692  0.136 0.060 0.587 0.924 
Stock return (t-2) 0.179 0.104 1.097  0.144 0.081 0.565 0.212 
Log (# business segments) 2.500 2.708 0.861  2.457 2.485 0.756 0.009 
Asset growth (t-1) 0.075 0.051 0.222  0.079 0.064 0.224 0.051 
Employee growth (t-1) 0.030 0.020 0.198  0.042 0.039 0.192 0.004 
CEO characteristics       
Total compensation 8.202 6.156 8.204  4.985 2.996 7.470 0.000 
Non-incentive compensation 1.370 1.089 2.017  0.922 0.815 0.638 0.000 
Cash incentive compensation 1.999 1.319 2.958  1.417 0.640 3.735 0.000 
Equity incentive 
compensation 
4.832 3.408 6.025  2.644 0.882 4.770 0.000 
Proportion incentive pay (t-1) 0.743 0.815 0.206  0.619 0.708 0.292 0.000 
Log (firm-related wealth) 9.768 9.971 2.210  10.033 10.361 3.093 0.000 
Founder CEO 0.019 0.000 0.136  0.109 0.000 0.312 0.000 
CEO age 55.693 56.000 6.434  55.927 55.000 8.584 0.627 
CEO tenure 6.335 5.000 6.142  10.126 7.000 9.387 0.000 
New CEO 0.109 0.000 0.311  0.098 0.000 0.298 0.439 
Ownership Characteristics         
Institutional ownership 0.746 0.816 0.276  0.731 0.806 0.296 0.516 
Block holders 1.637 1.000 1.745  1.661 1.000 1.785 0.688 
Board Characteristics         
% independent board 0.795 0.800 0.102  0.733 0.750 0.106 0.000 
Log (Board size) 2.299 2.303 0.204  2.175 2.197 0.220 0.000 
% board busy 0.570 0.566 0.197  0.465 0.523 0.209 0.000 
% board old 0.215 0.200 0.143  0.249 0.217 0.168 0.000 
CEO is Chairman 0.677 1.000 0.468  0.670 1.000 0.471 0.738 
Dual class shares 0.056 0.000 0.230  0.089 0.000 0.285 0.002 
Staggered board 
0.403 0.000 0.491  0.292 0.000 0.455 0.000 
% board appointed by CEO 0.498 0.500 0.382  0.490 0.500 0.424 0.890 
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Compensation Committee Characteristics      
Comp. committee - % busy 0.622 0.615 0.253  0.515 0.613 0.272 0.000 
Comp. committee - % old 0.252 0.250 0.219  0.302 0.270 0.238 0.000 
Log (Comp. committee size) 1.320 1.335 0.252  1.215 1.249 0.238 0.000 
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Panel B: 2009 onwards 
 (1) (2)   
  
Stay with 
Multiservice 
Switch to Related 
Specialist 
Significance 
of 
differences 
in Medians 
  Variables Mean Median Mean Median 
Number of observations 705 361  
Firm characteristics      
Log (Market cap.) 8.241 8.114 8.795 8.777 *** 
Book-to-market 0.667 0.547 0.703 0.503  
ROA 0.093 0.088 0.082 0.078 ** 
∆ROA (t-1) -0.002 0.001 0.004 0.003  
Stock return (t-1) -0.010 -0.082 0.337 0.162 *** 
Stock return (t-2) 0.118 0.033 0.206 0.069  
Log (# business segments) 2.479 2.708 2.247 2.398 *** 
Asset growth (t-1) 0.038 0.027 0.038 0.043 * 
Employee growth (t-1) 0.003 0.004 -0.008 0.000  
CEO characteristics      
Total compensation 6.964 5.813 9.523 7.632 *** 
Non-incentive comp. 1.339 1.061 1.482 1.211 *** 
Cash incentive comp. 1.744 1.307 2.521 1.838 *** 
Equity incentive comp. 3.879 3.140 5.530 4.169 *** 
Proportion incentive pay 0.757 0.823 0.803 0.842 *** 
Log (firm-related wealth) 9.953 9.887 9.985 10.092 * 
Founder CEO 0.007 0.000 0.008 0.000  
CEO age 56.287 56.000 56.967 57.000 ** 
CEO tenure 7.214 5.000 6.180 4.000 ** 
New CEO 0.104 0.000 0.136 0.000  
Ownership Characteristics      
Institutional ownership 0.784 0.845 0.765 0.800 *** 
Block holders 2.020 2.000 1.872 1.000  
Board Characteristics      
% independent board 0.795 0.809 0.817 0.833 *** 
Log (Board size) 2.291 2.303 2.359 2.313 *** 
% board busy 0.550 0.563 0.596 0.600 *** 
% board old 0.220 0.204 0.247 0.243 *** 
CEO is Chairman 0.672 1.000 0.654 1.000  
Dual class shares 0.050 0.000 0.039 0.000  
Staggered board 0.421 0.000 0.388 0.000  
% board appointed by CEO 0.455 0.429 0.473 0.500  
Compensation Committee Characteristics  
Comp. committee - % busy 0.599 0.615 0.652 0.667 *** 
Comp. committee - % old 0.265 0.250 0.281 0.261 * 
Log (Comp. committee size) 1.347 1.386 1.369 1.386  
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Table 6. Determinants of compensation consultant usage and switching behaviour. 
This table reports coefficients from logistic regressions. The dependent variables are: (1) whether a firm 
uses a compensation consultant in the current year; (2) whether a firm with a multiservice compensation 
consultant switches to a related spin-off specialist after 2009; (3) whether a firm with a multiservice 
compensation consultant switches to a related spin-off specialist after 2009 (coded 0), or switches to an 
unrelated specialist after 2009 (coded 1), or stays with the multiservice consultant (coded 2). The 
coefficients shown for binomial regressions (1) and (2) are associated with a higher likelihood of the 
consultant usage or switching behaviour. The coefficients shown for ordered logit regression (3) are 
associated with a higher likelihood of higher coded choices, i.e., a lower likelihood of switching to a 
related spun-off consultant. All variables are as defined in Appendix II. The p-value for the logistic 
regression z-statistic is shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
  
Firm uses 
consultant 
(1)   
Firm switches 
to related spin-
off from multi-
service (2)   
Ordered logit: 
Firm switches to 
related spinoff 
(baseline), 
switches to 
unrelated spinoff, 
or stays with 
multiservice (3)   
Log (Market capitalization) -0.02  0.21 ** -0.19 *** 
 (0.71)  (0.03)  (0.01)  
Book-to-market -0.09  0.38 *** -0.25 *** 
 (0.16)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
ROA -1.70 *** -3.03 ** 0.77  
 (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.30)  
∆ROA 1.59  2.19  -1.69  
 (0.10)  (0.19)  (0.16)  
Stock return (t-1) 0.00  0.09  -0.10  
 (0.95)  (0.25)  (0.12)  
Stock return (t-2) 0.02  0.05  -0.05  
 (0.64)  (0.45)  (0.35)  
Log (# business segments) -0.06  -0.15  0.15 * 
 (0.43)  (0.22)  (0.08)  
Employee growth (t-1) 0.00  -0.97 * 0.60 * 
 (0.99)  (0.06)  (0.09)  
Proportion incentive pay 1.47 *** 1.32 ** -0.89 ** 
 (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Log (firm-related wealth) -0.07 *** -0.01  0.04  
 (0.01)  (0.93)  (0.44)  
Founder CEO -1.16 *** -0.46  0.45  
 (0.00)  (0.57)  (0.53)  
CEO age 0.00  -0.02  0.02 * 
 (0.94)  (0.14)  (0.09)  
CEO tenure -0.04 *** -0.02  0.02  
 (0.00)  (0.17)  (0.11)  
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New CEO -0.27  -0.10  0.09  
 (0.18)  (0.71)  (0.64)  
log board size 0.89 *** 0.58  -0.59 ** 
 (0.00)  (0.18)  (0.04)  
% independent board 1.08 ** -1.12  0.57  
 (0.03)  (0.20)  (0.33)  
CEO is Chairman 0.04  0.06  -0.04  
 (0.72)  (0.77)  (0.74)  
Dual class shares -0.43 ** -0.04  0.14  
 (0.04)  (0.92)  (0.65)  
Staggered board 0.75 *** 0.18  -0.13  
 (0.00)  (0.30)  (0.27)  
% board appointed by CEO 0.27 * 0.13  -0.02  
 (0.07)  (0.59)  (0.93)  
Institutional ownership -0.17  -0.79 ** 0.50 * 
 (0.39)  (0.04)  (0.06)  
Block holders -0.01  0.00  0.00  
 (0.72)  (0.98)  (0.90)  
Compensation committee - % busy 1.20 *** 0.91 *** -0.56 ** 
 (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.02)  
Compensation committee - % old -0.73 *** -0.47  0.27  
 (0.00)  (0.18)  (0.26)  
Log (compensation committee size) 0.18  -0.48  0.31  
 (0.42)  (0.20)  (0.24)  
       
Industry-fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year-fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Sample size 5,952  1,040  1,364  
Pseudo-R² 0.599  0.367  0.255  
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Table 7. Matched-pairs analysis of pay levels and consultant usage 
This table reports the difference in compensation levels for matched-pairs of firm-years, where one firm 
uses a compensation consultant and the other firm does not. Matching is based on propensity scores 
using 1:1 caliper matching. Matching is based on the propensity to hire a compensation consultant from 
firm, CEO, and governance characteristics (explanatory variables shown in Table 6). All variables are 
as defined in Appendix II. Panel A shows the covariates for firms that use consultants (treatment) and 
firms that do not use consultants (control), as well as p values for t-tests and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests 
for differences between the two samples, using Firm, CEO, and governance characteristics for 
matching. Panel B shows the mean and median differences, which are measured as the compensation 
level for a firm that uses a compensation consultant, minus the level for a matched firm that does not 
use a consultant. 
Panel A: Covariates Mean Mean Median Median t-stat K-S 
  treatment control treatment control p value p value 
Log (Market capitalization) 8.290 8.292 8.172 8.238 0.988 0.901 
Book-to-market 0.525 0.569 0.437 0.470 0.988 0.348 
ROA 0.098 0.099 0.084 0.089 0.396 0.834 
∆ROA (t-1) 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.396 0.581 
Stock return (t-1) 0.203 0.147 0.095 0.098 0.877 0.834 
Stock return (t-2) 0.287 0.199 0.117 0.149 0.877 0.286 
Log (# business segments) 2.441 2.414 2.565 2.639 0.466 0.901 
Employee growth (t-1) 0.039 0.050 0.032 0.051 0.466 0.116 
Proportion incentive pay 0.743 0.739 0.802 0.796 0.275 0.668 
Log (firm-related wealth) 9.968 9.988 10.224 10.257 0.276 0.951 
Founder CEO 0.016 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.579 1.000 
CEO age 55.102 54.884 55.368 55.000 0.579 0.999 
CEO tenure 7.156 7.544 6.000 6.500 0.760 0.668 
New CEO 0.016 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.760 1.000 
% independent board 2.237 2.222 2.303 2.284 0.395 0.419 
Log (Board size) 0.800 0.789 0.800 0.791 0.395 0.148 
CEO is Chairman 0.661 0.710 1.000 1.000 0.858 0.981 
Dual class shares 0.022 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.858 1.000 
Staggered board 0.328 0.328 0.000 0.000 0.929 1.000 
% board appointed by CEO 0.470 0.451 0.500 0.414 1.000 0.834 
Institutional ownership 0.781 0.769 0.865 0.854 0.929 0.668 
Block holders 1.742 1.726 2.000 1.000 1.000 0.995 
Comp. committee - % busy 0.582 0.578 0.615 0.613 0.716 0.951 
Comp. committee - % old 0.260 0.247 0.250 0.242 0.716 0.286 
Log (Comp. committee size) 1.287 1.292 1.309 1.309 0.501 0.995 
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Panel B: Matched Pairs 
    
Mean 
difference 
Median 
difference 
t- 
statistic 
  Signed  
rank 
test 
  
   N      
        
Compensation        
Log (Total Compensation) 181 22.29% 21.40% 4.18 *** 3,497 *** 
        
Components of compensation        
 Log (Salary & Benefits)  8.14% 3.55% 2.54 ** 1,923 *** 
 Log (Cash incentive pay)  7.13% 6.01% 1.21  924  
 Log (Equity pay)  22.20% 15.49% 3.54 *** 2,463 *** 
        
Proportion incentive pay (t)  7.1 pp 2.2 pp 4.06 *** 2,797 *** 
Equity incentive pay % (t)  4.3 pp 2.4 pp 1.55  1,030  
Options as a % of Equity Pay (t)  -1 pp 0 pp -0.24  -93  
        
CEO Deferred Comp (% of Total Comp)  0.3 pp 0 pp -0.76  -391  
CEO Options (% of Firm's Total Option Exp.)  0.2 pp -0.8 pp -0.11  284  
Top 5 Exec Options (% of Firm's Total Option Exp.)  -2.8 pp -1.2 pp 0.82  251  
Log (CEO's Options Avg. Remaining Vesting Period)  -0.02 0.00 0.61  74  
        
Firm performance        
ΔROA (t)  -0.1 pp 0.3 pp -0.26  248  
Stock return (t)  32.9 pp -0.2 pp 1.44  914  
Employee growth (t)  -1.3 pp -1.9 pp -0.75  -961  
Asset growth (t)  -0.3 pp -1.7 pp -0.16  -763  
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Table 8. The effect of consultant turnover on pay around the additional disclosure 
requirement of 2009 
Panel A. Remain with multiservice consultant vs. switching to related spin-off specialist 
consultants 
This table reports a matched-pairs analysis of firms that remain with multiservice consultants instead 
of switching to related spin-off specialist consultants after the 2009 disclosure change. Matching is 
based on the propensity to switch to a related specialist from a multiservice consultant from firm, CEO, 
and governance characteristics (explanatory variables shown in Table 6). Panel A1 shows pre-2009 
differences in pay comparing firms that switch to a related spin-off specialist firms to those that stay 
with the same multiservice consultant after the disclosure change. Panel A2 shows post-2009 
differences in pay comparing firms that switch to a related spin-off specialist firms to those that stay 
with the same multiservice consultant. Variables are as defined in Appendix II. 
 
Panel A1: Matched Pairs, pre-2009 
    
Mean 
difference 
Median 
difference 
t- 
statistic 
  Signed  
rank 
test 
  
   N      
        
Compensation        
Log (Total Compensation) 236 -13.91% -13.68% -3.73 *** -3,419 *** 
        
Components of compensation        
 Log (Salary & Benefits)  -8.06% -6.61% -3.39 *** -3,913 *** 
 Log (Cash incentive pay)  -14.98% -10.12% -4.06 *** -3,513 *** 
 Log (Equity pay)  -10.01% -6.06% -2.01 ** -1,689 * 
        
Proportion incentive pay (t)  -2.3 pp -1.3 pp -2.15 ** -1,734 * 
Equity incentive pay % (t)  -0.3 pp 0.5 pp -0.18  193  
Options as a % of Equity Pay (t)  8.3 pp 10.6 pp 2.53 ** 2,439 *** 
        
CEO Deferred Comp (% of Total Comp)  -0.3 pp 0 pp -1.16  -653  
CEO Options (% of Firm's Total Option Exp.)  0.4 pp -0.3 pp 0.32  32  
Top 5 Exec Options (% of Firm's Total Option Exp.)  3.3 pp -0.2 pp 1.25  226  
Log (CEO's Options Avg. Remaining Vesting Period)  -0.01 0.00 -0.22  -20  
        
Firm performance        
ΔROA (t)  0.2 pp -0.1 pp 0.65  326  
Stock return (t)  0.5 pp -5.1 pp 0.08  -180  
Employee growth (t)  2.3 pp 2.4 pp 1.98 ** 2,091 ** 
Asset growth (t)  0.1 pp 0.5 pp 0.09  100  
 
- 45 - 
 
Panel A2: Matched Pairs, post-2009 
    
Mean 
difference 
Median 
difference 
t- 
statistic 
  Signed  
rank 
test 
  
   N      
        
Compensation        
Log (Total Compensation) 236 -13.48% -18.32% -3.29 *** -3,483 *** 
        
Components of compensation        
 Log (Salary & Benefits)  -9.62% -6.66% -3.89 *** -4,559 *** 
 Log (Cash incentive pay)  -11.42% -9.50% -2.54 ** -2,157 ** 
 Log (Equity pay)  -9.52% -10.95% -1.82 * -2,198 ** 
        
Proportion incentive pay (t)  -1.6 pp -1 pp -1.35  -1,236  
Equity incentive pay % (t)  1.3 pp -0.6 pp 0.64  322  
Options as a % of Equity Pay (t)  2.4 pp 0 pp 0.83  739  
        
CEO Deferred Comp (% of Total Comp)  -0.2 pp 0 pp -0.73  -143  
CEO Options (% of Firm's Total Option Exp.)  0.1 pp 0.8 pp 0.06  155  
Top 5 Exec Options (% of Firm's Total Option Exp.)  2.8 pp 2.2 pp 0.87  243  
Log (CEO's Options Avg. Remaining Vesting Period)  -0.02 0.00 -0.77  -196  
        
Firm performance        
ΔROA (t)  -0.5 pp -0.5 pp -1.46  -2,203 ** 
Stock return (t)  -4.5 pp -1.7 pp -1.71 * -343  
Employee growth (t)  3.7 pp 1.2 pp 2.37 ** 1,589  
Asset growth (t)  2.1 pp 0.7 pp 1.61  284  
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Panel B. Remain with multiservice consultant vs. switching to unrelated specialist 
This table reports a matched-pairs analysis of firms that remain with multiservice consultants instead 
of switching to unrelated specialist consultants after the 2009 disclosure change. Matching is based on 
the propensity to switch to an unrelated specialist from a multiservice consultant from firm, CEO, and 
governance characteristics (explanatory variables shown in Table 6). Panel B1 shows pre-2009 
differences in pay comparing firms that switch to an unrelated specialist firms to those that stay with 
the same multiservice consultant after the disclosure change. Panel B2 shows post-2009 differences in 
pay comparing firms that switch to an unrelated specialist firms to those that stay with the same 
multiservice consultant. Variables are as defined in Appendix II. 
Panel B1: Matched Pairs, pre-2009 
    
Mean 
difference 
Median 
difference 
t- 
statistic 
  Signed  
rank 
test 
  
   N      
        
Compensation        
Log (Total Compensation) 187 -4.00% -2.21% -0.86  -751  
        
Components of compensation        
 Log (Salary & Benefits)  -0.62% -1.83% -0.31  -368  
 Log (Cash incentive pay)  -10.74% -9.72% -2.37 ** -1,693 ** 
 Log (Equity pay)  -1.74% 3.28% -0.31  -282  
        
Proportion incentive pay (t)  0.2 pp 0.1 pp 0.10  83  
Equity incentive pay % (t)  3.9 pp 4.4 pp 1.82 * 1,379 * 
Options as a % of Equity Pay (t)  6.7 pp 4.9 pp 2.03 ** 1,374 ** 
        
CEO Deferred Comp (% of Total Comp)  0.4 pp 0 pp 2.43 ** 853 * 
CEO Options (% of Firm's Total Option Exp.)  -1.2 pp 0.3 pp -0.55  90  
Top 5 Exec Options (% of Firm's Total Option Exp.)  -0.7 pp 0.4 pp -0.23  88  
Log (CEO's Options Avg. Remaining Vesting Period)  0.02 0.02 0.49  140  
        
Firm performance        
ΔROA (t)  0.3 pp 0.2 pp 1.24  1,194 * 
Stock return (t)  2.7 pp 7.9 pp 0.30  406  
Employee growth (t)  3.1 pp 2 pp 2.13 ** 1,488 ** 
Asset growth (t)  1.1 pp 1.8 pp 0.55  945  
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Panel B2: Matched Pairs, post-2009 
    
 N  
Mean 
difference 
Median 
difference 
t- 
statistic 
  Signed  
rank 
test 
  
      
        
Compensation        
Log (Total Compensation) 187 -7.70% -4.53% -1.60  -963  
        
Components of compensation        
 Log (Salary & Benefits)  0.40% 0.54% 0.17  13  
 Log (Cash incentive pay)  -5.55% -5.81% -1.18  -721  
 Log (Equity pay)  -11.08% -4.05% -1.89 * -1,331 * 
        
Proportion incentive pay (t)  -1.7 pp 0.3 pp -1.10  -522  
Equity incentive pay % (t)  -1 pp -0.5 pp -0.47  -570  
Options as a % of Equity Pay (t)  5 pp 0 pp 1.32  723  
        
CEO Deferred Comp (% of Total Comp)  0.5 pp 0 pp 2.22 ** 1,227 *** 
CEO Options (% of Firm's Total Option Exp.)  1.9 pp 1.4 pp 0.90  131  
Top 5 Exec Options (% of Firm's Total Option Exp.)  1.4 pp 2.7 pp 0.36  104  
Log (CEO's Options Avg. Remaining Vesting Period)  0.02 0.04 0.49  98  
        
Firm performance        
ΔROA (t)  0 pp -0.1 pp 0.00  -40  
Stock return (t)  -27 pp -14.4 pp -1.28  -1,026  
Employee growth (t)  -2 pp -0.4 pp -1.71 * -916  
Asset growth (t)  -2 pp 0.3 pp -1.62  -489  
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Table 9. Matched pairs analysis using changes on initial consultant adoption 
This table reports the difference in changes in compensation for a matched sample of firms that start 
using a compensation consultant. Client firms that enter the compensation consultant market are 
matched to firms that do not use a compensation consultant. Matching is based on propensity scores to 
start hiring a compensation consultant (using firm, CEO, and governance characteristics in Table 6) 
using 1:1 caliper matching. The mean and median differences report both the change in compensation 
for a client firm that decides to start using a compensation consultant market, compared to the change 
for a matched firm that does not use a consultant, and the pre-adoption difference in pay levels. Firm-
years with CEO turnover are excluded. Variables are as defined in Appendix II. 
      
    
Mean 
difference 
Median 
difference 
t- 
statistic 
  Signed  
rank 
test 
  
   N      
        
Changes in compensation        
 Δ Log (Total compensation) 113 15.98% -6.44% 2.20 ** 554  
 Δ Log (Non-incentive pay)  0.88% 0.21% 0.39  89  
 Δ Log (Cash incent. pay)  2.72% 1.75% 0.34  43  
 Δ Log (Equity pay)  19.93% 2.14% 2.48 ** 568 * 
 Δ Proportion incentive pay  1.6 pp -0.2 pp 0.56  48  
 Δ Equity incentive pay % (t)  6.9 pp 0.3 pp 1.72 * 564 * 
 Δ Options as a % of Equity Pay (t)  2 pp 0 pp 0.52  19  
        
 ∆ CEO Deferred Comp (% of Total Comp)  -0.7 pp 0 pp -1.75 * -91  
 ∆ CEO Options (% of Firm's Total Option Exp.)  -1.2 pp 0.3 pp -0.40  -11  
 ∆ Log (CEO's Options Avg. Remaining Vesting Period)  -0.9 pp -1.9 pp -0.20  -41  
 ∆ Top 5 Exec Options (% of Firm's Total Option Exp.)  -2.8 pp -1.6 pp -1.14  -111 * 
         
Firm performance        
 ΔROA (t)  1.6 pp 0.2 pp 1.78 * 277  
 Stock return (t)  3.3 pp 12 pp 0.10  118  
 Employee growth (t)  4.1 pp 0.7 pp 2.03 ** 384  
 Asset growth (t)  3.9 pp -0.3 pp 1.36  256  
        
Pre-Adoption Levels        
 Log (Total compensation) 113 6.32% -2.55% 0.63  251  
 Log (Salary & Benefits)  -0.59% -4.59% -0.18  -169  
 Log (Cash incentive pay)  -74.60% 6.00% -0.93  370  
 Log (Equity pay)  -22.56% 0.00% -0.32  173  
 Proportion incentive pay (t)  4.3 pp 0.7 pp 1.16  263  
 Equity incentive pay % (t)  4.5 pp 0 pp 0.94  285  
 Options as a % of Equity Pay (t)  -4.3 pp 0 pp -0.55  -71  
        
 CEO Deferred Comp (% of Total Comp)  0.4 pp 0 pp 1.16  10  
 CEO Options (% of Firm's Total Option Exp.)  -0.6 pp 3.3 pp -0.16  89  
 Log (CEO's Options Avg. Remaining Vesting Period)  3.5 pp 8.9 pp 0.79  109  
 Top 5 Exec Options (% of Firm's Total Option Exp.)  -10.8 pp -10.5 pp -1.93 * -166  
  
